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1. INTRODUCTION
The reactor physics of the CANDU®1 safety case are
characterized by a high level of defence in depth based on
a combination of inherent characteristics and engineered
safety features. In particular, CANDU 6 reactors are
equipped with two independent, highly reliable shutdown
systems, each of which includes two signals triggering
shutdown for all initiating events. These engineered
systems complement the inherent reactor characteristics
of small reactivity coefficients and long neutron lifetime.
CANDU reactor operating characteristics are relatively
stable during operating life. However, the range of operating
conditions, and uncertainties in reactor physics models,
mean that variations in reactor physics basic parameters
should be considered. This paper considers safety analysis
sensitivity for LORC and LBLOCA events to variations in
reactivity coefficients reflected in the Power Coefficient
of Reactivity, and, in particular, demonstrates that variations
in PCR are not safety-significant for a reactor based on the
CANDU design.
Reactivity characteristics must be considered in the
context of the overall safety characteristics of the plant.
Without considering the interdependent effects of reactivity
characteristics and their interaction with engineered safety
systems, the measure of any one reactivity characteristic
is an insufficient measure of the reactor safety. Taking an
integrated approach is fundamental to understanding the
overall reactor safety case. Reactor designs take advantage
of their favourable inherent characteristics and compensate
for their unfavourable ones. Hence it is important to look
at variations in reactor characteristics, such as reactivity
coefficients, by studying the overall reactor behaviour in
operation, transients, and accidents. 
The combined effects of reactivity coefficients, along with other core nuclear characteristics, determine reactor core
behavior in normal operation and accident conditions. The Power Coefficient of Reactivity (PCR) is an aggregate indicator
representing the change in reactor core reactivity per unit change in reactor power. It is an integral quantity which captures the
contributions of the fuel temperature, coolant void, and coolant temperature reactivity feedbacks. All nuclear reactor designs
provide a balance between their inherent nuclear characteristics and the engineered reactivity control features, to ensure that
changes in reactivity under all operating conditions are maintained within a safe range. The CANDU® reactor design takes
advantage of its inherent nuclear characteristics, namely a small magnitude of reactivity coefficients, minimal excess
reactivity, and very long prompt neutron lifetime, to mitigate the demand on the engineered systems for controlling reactivity
and responding to accidents. In particular, CANDU reactors have always taken advantage of the small value of the PCR
associated with their design characteristics, such that the overall design and safety characteristics of the reactor are not
sensitive to the value of the PCR. For other reactor design concepts a PCR which is both large and negative is an important
aspect in the design of their engineered systems for controlling reactivity. It will be demonstrated that during Loss of
Regulation Control (LORC) and Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) events, the impact of variations in power
coefficient, including a hypothesized larger than estimated PCR, has no safety-significance for CANDU reactor design. Since
the CANDU 6 PCR is small, variations in the range of values for PCR on the performance or safety of the reactor are not
significant.
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2. CANDU CORE CHARACTERISTICS REGARDING
REACTIVITY TRANSIENTS
As with other reactor designs, the CANDU 6 design
has established a balanced set of inherent reactor physics
characteristics, combined with engineered safety
systems, to comprise a comprehensive safety case [1].
The main characteristics of the CANDU 6 core are:
• Small values of reactivity coefficients
• Relatively small changes in core conditions with time
• Low excess reactivity
• Long neutron lifetime
To complement the above characteristics, the CANDU 6
design includes control and safety systems which manage
the reactor response to the range of reactor conditions,
namely for normal operation, abnormal operating occur-
rences (AOO’s), design basis accidents (DBA), and severe
accident scenarios.
CANDUs are refuelled routinely at power. This is a
continuous process that obviates the need to carry excess
reactivity to compensate for fuel depletion. On-power
refueling also ensures a stable core condition over life, and
overall axial symmetry of both fuel and coolant neutronic
properties, minimizing the required worth of local control
absorbers. CANDU control devices are used mainly for
routine power operation rather than reactivity compensation.
The control devices therefore have low total and individual
reactivity worth. This is facilitated by the large core size,
allowing for numerous control devices, with any individual
device worth less than 2.5mk. In this way it is impossible
for the adverse movement of any individual device to lead
to reactivity insertion greater than the total delayed neutron
fraction, β (in range of 5.5mk under equilibrium conditions).
Furthermore, the location of all reactivity devices in the
low-temperature, low-pressure moderator (they do not
penetrate the coolant pressure boundary) rules out the
possibility of a control-rod ejection.
The CANDU 6 core has very low values of reactivity
coefficients. This means that the neutronic characteristics
of the core do not change significantly since operating
parameters, such as moderator temperature or neutron
poison concentration, very little during normal reactor
operation. In particular, the fuel temperature reactivity
coefficient (FTC) is negative for the range of burnups in
an operating core at nominal conditions. This provides an
inherent negative fast feedback for any events which lead
to increases in fuel temperature, such as a power rise, or
accidents which interrupt fuel cooling. The overall power
coefficient of reactivity (PCR) has a very low value, so that
power maneuvering from 0 to 100% full power requires very
little adjustment of reactivity devices. This also simplifies
shutdown management. The major reactivity change during
power maneuvers or for a period of shutdown after normal
operation arises from Xenon-135 buildup and decay, similar
to that in PWR reactor types. The low absolute values of
reactivity coefficients also lead to low values of uncertainties
and variations in these coefficients, as discussed in section
5 below. Due to the use of heavy water D2O as a moderator
and the separation of fuel in individual fuel channels, the
CANDU 6 core has a long neutron lifetime, in the order of
900µs – about 30 to 45 times longer than that of typical
PWRs.
The significance of the long neutron lifetime for
CANDU 6 is that, for hypothetical increases in reactivity
near or beyond β, the reactor period (a measure of the
length of time for reactor flux to increase by a factor e)
does not decrease sharply as the reactivity increases. This
means that CANDU reactors have an inherent degree of
mitigation against sudden reactivity insertions. The reactor
period for all conditions stays in a range where either of
the two engineered shutdown systems (based on familiar
and well-proven technology) readily terminate any reactivity
transient before any prolonged overpower can occur.
The safety importance of individual reactivity coeffi-
cients is a function of speed, size, and sign. As noted above,
for CANDU reactors, the reactivity coefficients lead to
relatively small changes in core condition. The result is a
reactor which has characteristics that do not change signifi-
cantly over the operating range, that has a relatively low
speed of change due to the long neutron lifetime, and that
has small absolute values of reactivity coefficients.
The small power coefficient and long neutron lifetime
also contribute to a stable, readily controlled core. Stability
analysis demonstrates ample control system margins for
normal operations and the range of power maneuvering.
3. PCR AND REACTOR LICENSING GUIDELINES
3.1 IAEA Perspective
The IAEA does not prescribe specific requirements
for the power coefficient of reactivity. Instead, the IAEA
approach is to set out high level requirements [2], which
lead to a set of safety objectives. For all nuclear power
plant designs, the safety objectives are ensured by fulfilling
the three fundamental safety functions, namely; i) controlling
the reactivity, ii) cooling the fuel (removal of heat from
the core), and iii) confinement of radioactive materials and
control of operational discharges, as well as limitation of
accident releases. The fundamental safety functions are
further subdivided into safety functions, applicable to all
reactor designs. Specifically, the safety functions applicable
to ‘Controlling the Reactivity’ include:
• Preventing unacceptable reactivity transients
• Maintaining the reactor in a safe shutdown condition
after all shutdown actions
• Shutting down the reactor as necessary to prevent
anticipated operational occurrences (AOO) from leading
to design basis accidents (DBA) and shutting down the
reactor to mitigate the consequences of DBAs
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• Maintaining sufficient sub-criticality of fuel stored
outside the reactor coolant system but within the site
The primary means for the principle of prevention and
mitigation of accidents is the defence-in-depth strategy,
which is achieved by the incorporation of good design and
an appropriate combination of inherent and engineered
safety features that provide safety margins, diversity, and
redundancy [2]:
‘The design shall provide for control of the plant be-
haviour during and following a PIE, using inherent
and engineered features, i.e. uncontrolled transients
shall be
minimized or excluded by design to the extent possible’
The requirements pertaining to the design of the core
and control of reactivity are expected to demonstrate reactor
control in all operating conditions [2]:
‘The maximum degree of positive reactivity and its
maximum rate of increase by insertion in operational
states and design basis accidents shall be limited so
that no resultant failure of the reactor pressure bound-
ary will occur, cooling capability will be maintained
and no significant damage will occur to the reactor
core’
These safety requirements outlined in IAEA’s top
requirements document for the design of nuclear power
plants, founded on the fundamental safety objectives through
the implementation of the concept of defence-in-depth,
has influenced and subsequently been adopted by various
national regulatory agencies, such as the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission (CNSC). The IAEA requirements
recognize the combination of inherent features and engi-
neered systems providing assurance of safety.
As described above, the overall features of the CANDU 6
design are consistent with and meet the IAEA safety
objectives.
3.2 Canadian Regulatory Perspective
Licensing of CANDU-type reactors was initiated in
Canada, where licensing approaches applicable to CANDU
reactor characteristics were first developed. In Canada,
nuclear power is regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC). From the beginning the basic tenet
of the Canadian reactor safety philosophy was one of
defence-in-depth [3]:
‘One of the most important aspects of a defence-in-depth
philosophy is the prevention of upset conditions and
accidents which threaten the integrity of the fuel sheath
and the primary coolant system pressure boundary’
This approach is further reflected in CNSC’s latest
requirements document for new-build water-cooled nuclear
power plants, RD-337 “Design of New Nuclear Power
Plants” [4]. RD-337 identifies safety objectives and safety
goals for nuclear power plants, which are based on the
principles set forth by the IAEA in NS-R-1. The requirement
of RD-337 on the design of the reactor is design neutral.
The demonstration of reactor control in all operating condi-
tions and a sufficient safety margin for all shutdown states
is required (Section 8.1 of [4]):
“The maximum degree of positive reactivity and its
maximum rate of increase by insertion in normal
operation, AOO, and DBAs are limited so that no
resultant failure of the reactor of the reactor pressure
boundary will occur, cooling capability will be main-
tained, and no significant damage will occur to the
reactor core,” and
“The shutdown margin for all shutdown states is such
that the core will remain subcritical for any credible
changes in the core configuration and reactivity
addition.”
Specifically on the topic of PCR, the CNSC has ac-
knowledged that this topic has been reviewed and addressed
by CNSC’s regulatory and safety regime; [5]:
“A reactor design that has a positive power coefficient
of reactivity is quite acceptable provided that the
reactor is stable against power fluctuations, and that
the probability and consequences of any potential
accidents that would be aggravated by a positive
reactivity feedback are maintained within CNSC-
prescribed limits. These are known safety issues that
have long been addressed by the CNSC’s regulatory
and safety regime.”
In June 2009, IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review
Service) reviewed Canada’s regulatory framework. 
This review confirmed that the Canadian regulator is
diligent in ensuring that Canadian nuclear plants are follow-
ing internationally recognized standards. The following
was noted:
‘the CNSC takes into account internationally recognized
safety standards and recommendations and adopts or
adapts them in the extent possible… As an example,
the CNSC regulatory document RD-337, “Design of
New Nuclear Power Plants”, adopted the principles
set forth by the IAEA in NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear
Plants: Design, regarding design, the interfaces be-
tween NPP design and other topics, such as environ-
mental protection, radiation protection, ageing, human
factors, security, safeguards, transportation, and
accident and emergency response planning.’
This recent IRRS review confirms the CNSC’s align-
ment with IAEA requirements.
The regulatory bodies of other countries have accepted
the Canadian licensing criteria and documents equivalent
to those submitted for a reference plant in Canada. An
integral part of CANDU’s licensing acceptability is its
approach to safety. CANDU’s defence-in-depth approach
has been supported by many years of CANDU 6 reliability
data that reflect the importance of safety in design.
3.3 International Perspectives
With the IAEA set of internationally recognized and
technology neutral high-level standards and guides as a
backdrop, regulators in individual countries have adapted
and reflected these guidelines in their specific regulations
and in the practices and interpretations used to assess reactor
safety. For example, for LWRs, where a control rod ejection
accident can introduce a very rapid, large positive reactivity
insertion beyond the capability of engineered shutdown
systems, a large negative reactivity response is both neces-
sary and is accomplished in the design. Interpretation of
requirements depends on the overall safety case and in
particular on the probability of events representing a reactiv-
ity challenge. For example, in some reactor licensing a time-
at-risk argument is used to support variations from normal
operating reactivity characteristics. In other cases, the low
probability of an accident coupled with failure of engineered
safety systems provides a basis for the safety case.
A range of regulatory expressions of reactor design
safety are used by regulators in different jurisdictions;
many countries that have adopted CANDU reactors have
used technology-neutral statements following IAEA practice
or based on the Canadian (CNSC) approach, including
countries such as China that operate both CANDU and
LWRs. Safety cases are kept up to date in each country;
for example, in Canada, the Point Lepreau CANDU 6 unit
has been licensed for continued life-extended operation
following its restart after the current outage. 
In recent years, emphasis is being placed on harmonizing
regulatory requirements and adopting technology-neutral
approaches that measure reactor safety through the imple-
mentation of the defence-in-depth concept. Although there
are many international initiatives to align nuclear regulations
and hence eliminate nation specific requirements, some
design-specific elements occur in specific cases. 
From the beginning, Canada’s licensing philosophy
has been founded on the defence-in-depth concept. In the
recent review of the Canadian regulatory framework by
the IAEA, the IRRS review mission was clear to identify
CNSC’s alignment with the international IAEA standards.
Canadian regulations do not preclude the acceptability of
a positive reactivity coefficient; rather they establish
requirements that demonstrate reactor control for all
operating conditions, with a sufficient safety margin. An
integral part of CANDU’s licensing acceptability is its
approach to safety. Extensive operating experience has
demonstrated high standards for CANDU reactors in terms
of reliability and safe performance.
A comparison of the reactor characteristics and engi-
neered safety systems response of CANDUs and LWRs [6]
shows that in each case, reactivity insertion events are part
of the design basis, and that engineered safety systems
must be called upon to ensure that fuel is not damaged.
Therefore, safety cases are made based on the same overall
principles, to show that initiating events covering operating
transients and accidents are safely mitigated.
4. THE ROLE OF PCR ON REACTOR SAFETY
As noted in section 2 above, the role of reactivity
coefficients in reactor safety is part of the overall context
of safety design, with the combination of the reactor basic
characteristics and engineered safety systems. The power
coefficient is an overall measure of the reactivity change
per unit increase in reactor power, typically in mk/% power.
It can be evaluated over any power level, but tends to be
of greater interest at high power operation. It is a combi-
nation of all other coefficients for parameters that change
with power. However, the contributions from coolant void
/temperature (for CANDU), fuel temperature, and coolant
temperature (for PWR reactors) are of most interest. 
For LWR designs, given the large negative values of
fuel temperature and coolant temperature coefficients, the
power coefficient is likewise negative. Typical PWR values
for the power coefficient are -0.11mk/% power at BOC and
-0.23mk/% power at EOC in the power operating range.
The main components of PCR in CANDU include
the fuel temperature coefficient, which is the immediate,
short-timescale reactivity parameter that changes in response
to a change in conditions, the coolant void coefficient, which
responds to changes in coolant density over a somewhat
longer timescale, and the moderator temperature coefficient,
which responds in long timescales to reactor changes due
to the separate low temperature heavy water moderator
circuit in CANDU.
In CANDU, coolant conditions vary with reactor
power level and with age, as boiler and coolant system
conditions evolve. This study uses the licensing-basis
condition leading to the limiting value of PCR; an assumed
end-of-life full-power condition with significant boiler
fouling and coolant system aging considered. This represents
an extreme to the range of conditions encountered in normal
reactor operation. In the study reported here, a range of
values of PCR has been included, covering both small
negative and small positive values around this starting
condition. This ensures a full range of effects is covered,
and acts to confirm the large safety margins and absence
of cliff-edge effects. It is worth noting the connection of
these values to reactor design and safety. A PWR requires,
and possesses, large negative values of fuel temperature
and moderator temperature coefficients to ensure that
control rod ejection accidents can be compensated, and to
stabilize reactivity transients from the operating state, which
would otherwise be fairly rapid. In CANDU, given the small
values of the coefficients around the operating point and
the low reactivity worth of the control devices, strong
negative feedback is not relied upon in the safety case.
The immediate inherent reactivity feedback is via the fuel
temperature coefficient; as noted at Reference [1] recent
studies have established the small but negative value of
this coefficient. Under accident conditions, the limiting
fast and large positive reactivity event in CANDU is caused
by a large LOCA, and the rate of power rise is inherently
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limited by the reactor control system design and the long
prompt neutron lifetime. CANDU does not depend on
negative feedback to arrest the reactivity transient – reliable
shutdown systems have time to act, as the power rise before
shutdown is inherently slower than for the limiting accidents
in light water reactors. The second reactivity-addition
accident of concern is a loss of reactor regulation, assumed
to be, for example, an uncontrolled removal of absorber rods.
5. EFFECTS OF VARIATION IN PCR FOR LORC
The sensitivity to the range of power coefficient values
is assessed here for the Loss of Regulation Control (LORC)
event for CANDU-6. 
The safety analysis has used the physics lattice code
WIMS [7], neutron diffusion code RFSP [8], and the
thermal hydraulics code CATHENA [9].
Analysis has shown that the major contribution to
power coefficient is the coefficient related to changes in
coolant density. Because PCR is not an independent input
parameter into reactor computer models, the effect of
variation in overall PCR is evaluated by varying the value
of the coolant void reactivity coefficient by ± 15% from
the best estimate value in the sensitivity study. The 15%
variation envelopes the 95% percentile value in the WIMS
calculation. This methodology will be applied to the loss
of regulation control event (LORC) for three cases.
5.1 Case 1: Power Level - 103%FP and Insertion
Rate of 0.1 mk/s
During normal operation, reactivity is mainly controlled
by liquid zone controllers, adjuster rods, mechanical control
absorbers, and moderator poison. In a loss of regulation
control event, the maximum physical reactivity insertion
rate is 0.35mk/s assuming that all reactivity control mecha-
nisms malfunction simultaneously in the same direction
at their maximum speeds.
The analysis shows similar system response for the
three cases simulated. At a high power level of 103%FP
with 0.1mk/s reactivity insertion, ROP is the primary trip
signal followed by the high heat transport system pressure
trip. It was found that the timing of the ROP trip and HTSHP
trip is very similar for all three cases (-15%, +0%, and +15%
variation in CVR). It should be noted that in the event of
a loss of regulation control accident that the ROP trip would
occur for each shutdown system at an early stage in the
transient, limiting the level of overpower below that consid-
ered in this analysis, and limiting any degradation of fuel
conditions.
For the reference case (nominal CVR), the +15% CVR
case, and the -15% CVR case, the first trip was from the
ROP signal (SDS1). The trip time for all three cases was
4.24 seconds. For the reference case the second trip was
from the high power signal (SDS1); the trip time for this
was 8.67 seconds. For the +15% CVR case the second
trip was from the high log rate signal (SDS1); the trip
time for this was 8.44 seconds. For the -15% CVR case
the second trip was from the high power signal (SDS1);
the trip time for this case was 8.71 seconds.
The transient behaviour of the normalized core fission
power and outlet header pressure, crediting the second
SDS1 trip, is presented in Fig. 1. The peak reactor power
ranges from 1.75 to 1.79, while the peak pressure ranges
from 11.160MPa to 11.223MPa for the three cases. The
small difference in trip time, peak reactor power, and peak
ROH pressure supports the idea that the effect of a 15%
variation in coolant density reactivity feedback, which
reflects the power coefficient, is insignificant.
5.2 Case 2: Slow Loss of Regulation Control: Power
Level 103% and Insertion Rate of 0.0002mk/s
The three cases with the reactor operating at high power
103%FP and a reactivity insertion rate of 0.0002mk/s also
show similar system responses.
The analysis showed that the high heat transport system
pressure trip and high neutron power trip (ROP) are the first
two trip signals called upon. While the credited backup
trip is HTSHP for the +15% case, the trip time is very
similar between ROP and HTSHP with only a 0.47 second
difference between the two trips. Among the three cases,
the time when the SDS1 backup trip is called upon ranges
from 67.78 seconds to 76.62 seconds. Although the differ-
ence in backup trip time is larger than the 0.1mk/s reactivity
insertion case, it reflects the speed of the transient. While
the SDS1 backup trip time varies by approximately 9
seconds, the peak power and peak pressure are very
similar between the three cases, as shown in Fig. 2. The
peak reactor power varies between 1.16 and 1.17, while
the peak ROH pressure varies between 10.385MPa and
10.394MPa.
For the reference case (nominal CVR) the first trip
was from the high power signal (SDS1); the trip time for
this case was 71.06 seconds. For the +15% CVR case the
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Fig. 1. Normalized Core Fission Power 
(Initial Power 103%FP with an Insertion Rate of 0.1mk/s)
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first trip was from the ROP signal (SDS1); the trip time
for this case was 67.31 seconds. For the -15% CVR case
the first trip was from the high power signal (SDS1); the
trip time for this case was 74.41 seconds. For the reference
case the second trip was from the ROP signal (SDS1);
the trip time for this was 71.58 seconds. For the +15%
CVR case the second trip was from the high power signal
(SDS1); the trip time for this was 67.68 seconds. For the
-15% CVR case the second trip was from the ROP signal
(SDS1); the trip time for this case was 76.62 seconds.
The small difference in peak reactor power and peak
ROH pressure shows that the 15% variation in coolant
density reactivity feedback, which reflects the power
coefficient, is insignificant.
5.3 Case 3: Loss of Regulation Control from Low
Power: Power Level 40% and Insertion Rate
0.1mk/s
At a low power level of 40%FP and a reactivity insertion
rate of 0.1mk/s, trip coverage is provided by the high rate
log neutron power trip, high neutron power trip, and high
heat transport system pressure trip.
For the reference case (nominal CVR) the first trip
was from the high log rate signal (SDS1); the trip time
for this case was 14.45 seconds. For the +15% CVR case
the first trip was from the high log rate signal (SDS1); the
trip time for this case was 14.43 seconds. For the -15%
CVR case the first trip was from the high log rate signal
(SDS1); the trip time for this case was 14.87 seconds. For
the reference case the second trip was from the ROP signal
(SDS1); the trip time for this was 16.06 seconds. For the
+15% CVR case the second trip was from the ROP signal
(SDS1); the trip time for this was 15.99 seconds. For the
-15% CVR case the second trip was from the ROP signal
(SDS1); the trip time for this case was 16.13 seconds.
The normalized core fission power and outlet header
pressure transient evolution after the second trip is credited
is presented in Fig. 3. Again, the analysis results show that
the trip time for all three trip parameters are very similar
in the three cases. The peak reactor power ranges from
1.40 to 1.48 while the peak ROH pressure ranges from
10.412MPa to 10.462MPa.
The small difference in trip time, peak reactor power,
and peak ROH pressure shows that the 15% variation in
coolant density reactivity feedback, which reflects the power
coefficient, is insignificant.
6. EFFECTS OF VARIATION IN PCR FOR LBLOCA
Analysis has shown that the major contribution to
power coefficient is the coefficient related to changes in
coolant density. Because PCR is not an independent input
parameter into reactor models, the effect of variation in
overall PCR was evaluated by varying the value of the
coolant void reactivity coefficient. A 95% percentile
variation on the CVR uncertainty for a full-voided core is
considered in this assessment, in other words WIMS + 0.21,
rather than WIMS-1.6mk which was considered in the
reference case of Reference [10]. The 95% case was in
fact considered in Reference [10] as part of a 2 parameter
modelling sensitivity study. The other varied parameter
was CHF. The current assessment examines only the impact
of varying the CVR. The initial power and loop-loop tilt
of the initial core state are 94% FP and 4%, respectively.
This section presents the impact on large LOCA of
increasing the full core void reactivity (CVR) for the
Wolsong-1 reactor to a value corresponding to the 95th
percentile. For a fully-voided core this translates to a
CVR of WIMS+0.21mk [10]).
Reference [10] analyzed a best-estimate uncertainty
on a full-core CVR of -1.6mk. This is the best estimate
value of CVR bias for WIMS-AECL as recommended in
Reference [11] for all burn-ups. The -1.6mk bias resulted
in a full-core CVR of 16.11mk. Reference [10] also analyzed
a modeling sensitivity case for the 35% RIH break where
Fig. 3. Normalized Core Fission Power 
(Initial Power 40%FP with an Insertion Rate of 0.1mk/s)
Fig. 2. Normalized Core Fission Power
(Initial Power 103%FP with an Insertion Rate of 0.0002mk/s)
the CVR was increased to the 95th percentile value and
CHF increased by 2 sigma. In the current analysis, the
modeling sensitivity case is revisited for the 100% RIH
case but without the additional parameter study on CHF.
For this case (as per the modeling sensitivity study in [10]),
the full-core CVR is increased to 17.92mk (i.e., 16.11 +
1.645*1.1). This increase in the full-core CVR to 17.92mk
is performed via adjustment of the density scaling parameter
(“densc”), which is a direct input to RFSP. A re-simulation
of the steady state was not required since the setting of the
CHF in steady state does not affect the initial thermalhy-
draulic conditions. As such, the initial core state for the
current analysis is the same as that for the modeling sensi-
tivity case in [10]. In other words the same 4% loop-loop tilt
was maintained with reactor power at 94% FP. Moreover,
the thermalhydraulic conditions (coolant density, temper-
ature, and fuel temperature) are the same as those in the
modeling sensitivity case of [10].
The simulation of the 100% RIH break is performed
using the coupled physics code RFSP-IST version REL_3-
04-04 with the thermalhydraulic code CATHENA MOD
3.5d/Revision 2 on a PC environment, exactly as in [10].
The power pulse is terminated on the backup neutronic
trip, that being high rate of log power (HLR). The reactor
power and core-wide reactivity transients are presented
in the figures below.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show a marked increase in both the
relative core-wide reactor power and reactivity. For example,
for the 100% RIH break the peak relative power increases
from 3.4 to 4.6 whereas peak core-wide reactivity increases
from 4.1 to 4.8mk. However, this is still below the prompt
criticality level of 5.22. Reactor trip on high rate of log
power occurs at 0.379 seconds in the reference case and
0.367 seconds in the CVR+15% sensitivity case.
Deposited energy at 10 seconds increases from 279.6J/g
to 345.5J/g. Given an initial enthalpy for fuel of 400J/g,
the total fuel enthalpy remains well below the threshold
for fuel breakup (or 840J/g). The threshold for fuel break
(840J/g) is very conservative for CANDU fuel under large
LOCA conditions due to the relative long overpower (a few
seconds) and significant coolant blow-down heat removal
effect. In the experiments [11, 12], fuel heat up and heat
removal conditions are more severe than in a LOCA power
pulse, in terms of the power seconds during overpower
phases. Although most of the samples experienced centreline
melting, no phenomena were detected that indicate extensive
fuel breakup or release of noble gases greater than the
grain-boundary inventory fraction [11, 12]. Therefore,
the CANDU fuel is not expected to have breakup. With
fuel enthalpy below 840J/g, fuel centreline melting and
fuel breakup are not expected. 
For consequence during post overpower pulse period
prior to design Emergency Core Cooling Systems filled all
the channels, the fuel failure is expected, however, dose
releases due to such fuel failure are well below the licensing
limit for large LOCAs such as the reference case and this
sensitive case.
It must be remembered that CANDU-6 has two inde-
pendent fast acting shutdown systems, the rod-based SDS-1
system (modeled in the sensitivity study above), plus a
faster acting SDS-2 system (poison injection system). In
reality, each shutdown system would act, and the reactor trip
time would be earlier, with significantly reduced transient
conditions. More specifically, the analysis results above
were simulated taking credit for the backup SDS-1 neutronic
trip parameter, i.e., high rate of log power. While the trip
setpoint on SDS-2 HRLP is typically set higher than that
of SDS-1, a trip on the Regional Overpower Protection
System (ROP) of either shutdown system would occur
nearly 158ms earlier, i.e. around 0.210 seconds. The analysis
results above thus constitute a very conservative code bias
assumption compounded with the conservative application
of the slower of two fast-acting shutdown systems. In
summary, the 100% RIH break sensitivity analysis therefore
demonstrates that safety margins, while reduced as a result
of the conservative assessment, are adequate, despite the
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Fig. 5. Core-wide Reactivity Transients Showing Impact of
95th Percentile CVR from that Analyzed in Reference [10]
Fig. 4. Relative Reactor Power Transient Showing Impact of
95th Percentile CVR from that Analyzed in Reference [10]
overpower increase due to the very conservative approach
imposed on the CVR and marked increase in peak reactor
power simulations.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has discussed the power coefficient of
reactivity for CANDU 6 reactors, as it pertains to safety and
licensability, in the context of a wider nuclear industry. The
reactor physics of the CANDU safety case are characterized
by a high level of defence in depth based on a combination
of inherent characteristics and engineered safety features.
As the PCR in CANDU 6 is small, it plays little role in
the performance or safety of the reactor. 
The regulatory framework in a number of countries,
together with the broader framework in the IAEA, was
reviewed. For those countries with only, or predominantly,
light water reactor technology deployed, it was found that
regulations tend to include references to negative reactivity
feedback characteristics. In contrast, international regulatory
approaches, such as those of the IAEA, which encompass
a range of reactor technologies, do not emphasize negative
reactivity feedback requirements, but rather emphasize
defence in depth, and the requirement to show that all
initiating events covering operating transients and accidents
are safely mitigated. The Canadian regulator states that a
reactor design that has a positive power coefficient of
reactivity is quite acceptable provided that the reactor is
stable against power fluctuations, and that the probability
and consequences of any potential accidents that would
be aggravated by a positive reactivity feedback are main-
tained within prescribed limits. The accident analysis results
presented in this paper then proceed to demonstrate, for
the loss regulation control event as well as large loss of
coolant accident, that the CANDU-6 reactor certainly meets
such requirements, even in the face of the most conservative
assumptions relating to the power coefficient of reactivity.
Specifically, both the sensitivity results for the LORC
and large LOCA cases demsonstrate that safety margins
are maintained, despite a very conservative approach to
incorporating a larger CVR code bias (as part of allowance
for a large variability in PCR). In conclusion, the CANDU
design provides an appropriate balance between inherent
safety characteristics and engineered safety features that
renders the design robust to variations in reactor parameters.
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